University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and
Interviews

Mike Mansfield Papers

12-19-1970

Congressional Record S. 20782-4 - Prisoners of War and the Paris
Talks
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "Congressional Record S. 20782-4 - Prisoners of War and the Paris Talks"
(1970). Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews. 943.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/943

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University
of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

s 20784

CONGRESSION AL RECORD- SENATE

vised, I believe to face frankly the reality
that there is more to bringing about an
end to our involvement in Indochina.
than the removal of a. substantial part
of our expeditionary forces fr om Vietnam-a step which I do not deprecate
· but commend in every way. The fact is,
l1owever, that what we are dealing with
ii; hydra-headed. While the drawndown
of U.S. ground forces has helped to re·quce casualties in one area, the other
eittrapments have tightened their hold
u)Jon this Nation.
· I would hope the Senate, therefore, in
the closing days of the expiring Congress,
in )l time of haste and weariness, will
no(have acted in a fashion which lends
encouragement or support in any way,
shape, or form to a deepening of this
tragrdy which has already done so much
to e!·ode the foundations of the Nation's
unity and stabl!ity.
I Would hope, too, that the President in
his Continuing search for a responsible
settlement, might oonsider directing
that a pointed effort be made to seek
new ingresses to a. peaceful solution
either \11 Paris or elsewhere. It seems to
me tha~ the executive branch might try
to concentrate its negotiating attention
a.t this time in an effort to determine
whether the release of all U.S. prisoners
of war might not better be secured as a
quid pro quo, if we were prepared to set
forth a timetable for the progressive
withdrawal of the balance of the U.S.
forces in Vietnam at this time, both
events to take place under the umbrella
of a ceasefire which would bring, of
course, an immediate end to all U.S.
casualties. Something along these lines
is within the scope of the President's
October 7 statement. At the same time,
the release of U.S. prisoners is within
the scope of peace proposals which were
made by North Vietnam on September
17.
This week, at the 95th session of the
peace talks in Paris, Madam Nguyen Thi
Binh repeated a previous proposal offering an immediate cease-fire in Vietnam
In return for a declaration of United
States and allied troop withdrawal by
June 30, 1971.
She also stated that U.S. acceptance
of this proposal would mean immediate
negotiations on the release of captured
American prisoners. Madame Binh ignored the U.S. proposal that meetings
be held every day to try to bring about
the release of all U.S. prisoners by Christmas.
· Shortly after that meeting concluded,
Xuan Thuy, the chief of the North Vietnamese delegation, noting that Ambassador Bruce has rejected the proposal
for a U.S. withdrawal by June 30, 1971,
said :
I , t herefore, propose that 1! the United
States ls not wllllng to accept June 30, 1971
as the dAt e !or final Withdrawal o! all lts
troops, then lt should suggest another r easonable date. In that case, we can Immediat ely
colls lder the American suggestion.

At the 95th conference, Ambassador
Bruce, after calling for "immediate negotiations on an internationally ·supervised ceasefire-in-place throughout all
of Indochina," repeated the readiness of
the United States to negotiate on an
agreed timetable "for complete troop
withdrawal as part of an overall settle-

ment in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."
P erhaps in this give-and-take at Paris
a nd also based in part on the President's
proposals of October 7 and Hanoi's proposals of Sept~mber 17, the two points
to which reference is made-that is, the
r elease of all U.S. prison ers of war coupled to a timetable for the final withdrawal of U.S. forces-might be explored
exclusively-and I emphasize that word
"exclusively" because that would mean
setting these two issues apart--to see
whether ' or not t hey may be reconciled
as a starting point of a ceasefire to be
followed by the negotiation of a complete
settlemen t . It would be my hope, Mr.
President, that this approach may light
a clear signpost to peace.
May I say th at I submit these thoughts
with an 1Ul.derstan ding and appreciation,
I think, of the complexities and L'ltransigences wh ich confron t the President.
I submit them , nevertheless, in concern
lest we find ourselves operating under a
new fail-safe-deeper within this tragic
involvementr-a new point of no return
in Indochina.

Dece1~~ber 19, 1970

had a very interesting experience a bout
a month ago when I met for over an
hour with North Vietnam's Delegate
General to France, Mr. Mai Van Bo. At
that time I discussed with him some of
the same matters which the distinguished majonty leader has discussed
today.
Unfortun.._ately, in her speech, Madam
Binh, gave no indication that the Communist side at the Paris talks would be
willing to discuss the release of prisoners
unless we first announce that all American troops will be out of South Vietnam
by a given date.
Mr. MANSFIELD. By June 30.
Mr. GRIFFIN. By June 30. And, as the
distinguished majority leader has pointed out very appropriately, P resident
Nixon's proposal or initiative of October
7 indicated that our side is r eady t o discuss the matter of a withdrawal timetable. This is a matter wo are willing to
discuss. But to be realistic we must keep
in mind that the other side has refused
to talk about the subjects. The other side
refuses to discuss the release of prisoners. The other side refuses to discuss the
matter of a timetable. Madam Binh has
taken the position that her side will not
even engage In discussions concerning
the release of prisoners of war unless
and until after we unilaterally announce
that all troops wm be out by June 30.
Hopefully, the other side may change
its unreasonable position at some point.
B u t, unfortunately, that is their position
now, as I understand it. They will not
even discuss the matter.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Presiden t, will
the Senator yield at that point?
Mr. GRIFFIN. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I tried to bring out
in my speech a reference made by Xuan
Thuy, the chief of the North Vietnamese
delegation in Pru:is this week, at the 95th
session, which goes beyond what Madam
Binh has said, because the Senator's
statement about Madam Binh was absolutely correct. After that meeting, at
which Madam Binh restated the old
theme, "Withdraw by June 30, 1971, and
then we wlll discuss the prisoners · of
war," Xuan Thuy, chief of the North
Vietnamese delegation, said:

ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, would
the distinguished Senator from Missouri
(Mr. EAGLETON) yield briefiy to me, without losing h is righ t to the fioor?
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. P resident, I am
willing to yield for a brief period to the
Senator from Michigan with the understanding that I do n ot lose my right to
the fioor and that on resuming the fioor
my remarks do n ot constitute a second
speech. I do wan t to add that I have a
gentleman's understanding with the
Senator from Nevada <Mr. BIBLE) that
after a not unseemly period he should be
notified so he may come back and proceed on the DOT appropriation conference r eport.
Mr. GRIFFIN. May I have 10 minutes ?
Mr. EAGLETON. May I inquire of the
Chair h ow lon g we have been on matters
unrelated to the DOT conference report?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Fiftyeight minutes.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, would the
Senator yield to m e for 6 or 8 minutes?
Mr. EAGLETON. I would be pleased to
I, therefore, propose that lt the United
yield to any Senator who wants me to States ls not wllllng to accept Jun e 30, 1971,
yield, but I f eel under some moral obli- as the date tor final withdrawal o! a ll lt s
gation to the manager of the confer ence troops, then it should suggest another reasonable date. In that co.se, we can l mmcdlreport .
ately consider the American suggestion.
'
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
think the Senator from Missouri would
So it appears to me there is a good deal
be doin g the m anager of the conference of flexibility there, which may be tied in
report a f avor at this time by yielding.
with the proposals made by the Presiden t
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, with on October 7 of this year, because I
those words of the majority leader, I think the President's proposal had a
shall yield first to the Senator from great deal In the way of substance and
Michigan, then to the Senator from a great amount of flexibility.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I certainly would agree
Rhode Island, and then to the Sen ator
with the majority leader's description
from Kansas.
of the President's proposal. He proposed,
for example, that all prisoners of war be
P RISONERS OF WAR AND THE
released by both sides.
·
PARIS TALKS
His other proposals were not necessarily
tied
to
each
other.
They could be
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I listened with-close attention to the remarks considered as a whole, or in parts, or in
of the distinguished majority leader, and groups related or unrelated, but there
I appreciate his reference to a proposal were no conditions.
made ea rlier this week by th e junior
I hope that perhaps the majority leadSenator from Michigan concerning pris- er's interpretation of xuan Thuy's reoners of war.
mark m ay Indicate some greater deAs I reported to the Senate earlier, I gree of flexibility than was the case be-
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The administration has indicated its support of such proposals.
Furthermore, the distinguished deputy
minority leader, the Senator from Michigan <Mr. GRIFFIN ), has advocated a propC'sal which likewise has the support of
tt e administration, relative to the release
of a certain number of prisoners of war
h~ld in South Vietnam in the hope that it
w6uld bring about reciprocal action by
the North Vietnamese.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, may we have order?
. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen~.te will be in order.
Mr. MANSFIELP. Mr. President, the
distinguished Senator from Kansas (Mr.
DoLE) has been very active in behalf of
the POW's-more active, perhaps, than
anyone else In the Senate, with some ex·ceptions, and certain people in this
country.
The Senator from Kar..sas (Mr. DoLE)
is to be commended for his unftagging
and unfailing interest.
It is the reporting by the Foreign Relations Committee to the Senate of Senate Resolution 486, which was submitted
by the distinguished Senator from Kansas joined in by 30 or 40 Senators, and
its adoption this morning, that I would
like to use as a basis for the remarks
which I am about to make, because my
thesis has to do with the talks in Paris
and their possible relations to negotiations seeking to bring about a release of
all the POW's held by North Vietnam at
the present time.
Mr. President, the President's policy
in bringing about a steady reduction of
forces in Vietnam has been commended,
properly, many times on the ftoor of the
Senate. The withdrawal is all to the good;
it Is in the Interests of this Nation. The
Senate has supported the progressive reduction; I have supported it, personally,
expressing only the hope that the exodus
might be speeded up. At the very least,
it has seemed to me that nothing ought
to be peimitted to Interfere in any way
with the progressive reduction of U.S.
forces, provided, of course, that the
forces stlll remaining at any time are
adequately safeguarded.
I would hope, for example, that neither
the words nor the actions of the executive branch or the Congress would delay
in any way the departure of all American forces from Indochina because only
a full withdrawal, in my judgment, can
serve the vital interests of the United
States. Only a full withdrawal will finally
end all Ameiican casualties which Is, after all, a fundamental of present policy,
as I understand lt. I repeat, Mr. President, not some but all American casualties must be ended as soon as possible.
There Is not and cannot be a tolerable
level of American casualties In a misbegotten war.
So once more, let me say that the PresIdent is to be commended for hewing to
his policy of continuing to draw down
U.S. forces and for exceeding the target
figure of reduction which he had established for this point in time. It is no mean
achievement to move the machinery of
the executive branch to bring about a
shift of this kind. Notwithstanding, I
must note, 1n all candor, that we are far
from out of the jungle in Indochina.

To sense how tightly we continue to be
ensnared, we had better look most carefully not only to the U.S. forces remaining in V.ietnam-there are almost 350,000
still there-well below the total of almost
550,000 2 years ago-but also to the contingents of U.S. personnel in Laos and
Thailand. We had better look, too, to U.S.
military activities other than ground action, whether air bombardments, naval
engagements, or whatever, which are still
taking place throughout the Indochinese
peninsula. We should note, also the expanding area of military action in which
our forces-be they on the ground, in the
air, or on the sea--are engaged. A U.S.
serviceman is no less a casualty if he is
killed when his helicopter strikes a mountain in Laos or his plane is shot down
while flying close support for a Vietnamese battalion in Cambodia than when he
is shattered by a bobbytrap outside
Saigon.
We had better take a look, too, at the
degree to which we continue to assume
and to increase--not only by our acts but
by our words-U.S. responsibilities for
the survival of governments in the capitals of all three Indochinese countries.
Finally, we will gage more accurately
the distance yet to go in ending this involvement by noting the lack of progress
in the meetings in Parts.
I regret to have to say it but I must
say It most soberly-by any of these
other measures there are no indications
of an end in sight to the involvement in
Indochina. I do not see that the scope of
that involvemerit has even shrunk In the
past year or so, with the significant exception already noted of the tactical curtailment of the use of U.S. forces, air,
sea, and ground.
We may well ask ourselves, for example, what Is changed in our relationship with the Saigon government? What
is its life expectancy without a continued
powerful U.S . military presence, not to
speak of a steady flow of massive U.S.
aid? What of the Government in Laos?
Does it stand closer to survival as a neutral or in any other independent way,
now that many Americans are engaged
there and the dollars flood into that
country? Is there a cutoff of either U.S.
casualties 9r aid in sight? When can the
withdrawal of the American contingents
be expected? What of the related aid and
contingents with regard to Thailand?
Then there is Cambodia. This time last
year there were perhaps 11 Americans
In a miniscule diplomatic mission and
no aid program of any kind . Hostile
forces were present only along the Cambodian-Vietnamese borders. No Americans were involved anywhere in Cambodia. No U.S. casualties of any kind were
being incurred ·in that country. To be
sure, there was a government 1n Phnom
Penh with only a fingertip grip on neutrality. Some considered that government not to be very friendly to the
United States and, Indeed, in its public
utterances frequently it was not.
Now there is a government which seems
more friendly to the United States. However, that government's hold on the country is dubious, even a few miles outside
the capital city In any direction. North
Vietnamese forces are no longer concentz·ated in the border sanctuaries but to-
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gether with Cambodian guerrilla forces,
they have spread in reinforced strength
over one-half to three-quarters of
Cambodia.
The staff of (1 Americans at the U.S.
mission in Phnom Penh a year ago has
burgeoned to 60 a t present and it is still
growing. The executive branch on its
own has already funneled through that
mission a commitment of $105 million to
the new Government of Cambodia. It has
asked the Congress not only to underwrite that commitment, but to join in
committing another $155 million , a step
which the Senate on Wednesday last said
that it was prepared to take. I would be
less than honest if I did not express my
concern at that decision although I bow,
of course, to the collective wisdom of
the Senate.
It should be n ot ed that the request
was made under a familiar slogan:
"spending dollars is better than spending
lives." Of course, it is better to spend
dollars; who would disagree with that
order of priority? But is the evaluation
valid?
Before we travel much further down
that road, we had better note that the
same slogan marked the beginning of the
U.S. involvement in Vietnam as well as
in Laos. Since then, we have scattered .
over a hundred billion dollars of the
people's tnxes along that slippery road.
Far more tragic, a total of over 53,000
American lives have ended and over
290,000 others have suffered wounds on
that tragic trail. In short, the accurate
evaluation in Indochina is not to be
found in the slogan: "better to spend
money than lives." No, Mr. President, if
we must use slogans, the more appropriate phrase in Indochina would appear
to be "aid-money first and lives later."
That has been the pattern to date.
We may ask ourselves, too, whether our
involvement in Indochina Is shrinking or
growing wh en we perceive that the airwar has long since been extended from
Vietnam to all of Laos and appears, now,
to be on the verge of an extension to all
of Cambodia. Moreover, what began as
an understandable sympathy for the
1,500 Americans who are believed to be
prisoners of Hanoi has given rise to words
· and actions, in multiplying indication
that the area of our military involvement may well be expanding still further
to reembrace bombing raids over North
Vietnam. It will be recalled that it was
the bombing of the North which led
originally to the deaths of many American airmen and the capture of almost
all of the Americans whom we now seek
to free from the prison camps of North
Vietnam. The raids were curtailed under
the previous administration and this
wastage of American lives was, at last,
halted. Are we n ow about to begin it all
over again?
Finally, if we would measare the distance to the end of our involvement we
should take into consideration what is
transpiring in the Paris talks. The overwhelming fact, there, is that, w1tU now,
there was libtle worth mentioning. The
talks are back almost to the beginning
of a beginning. Two years later, tl:}e>y are
as far from bonafide negotiation" as they
have ever been.
All 1n all, then, we would be well ad-

